What a Racial Justice Act Violation Means in the Dominguez Retrial

David Breaux and Karim Abou Najm were killed in Davis in spring 2023. Kimberlee Guillory survived a third attack. Those harms—and the legal responsibility for them—remain the center of the retrial now before a Yolo County jury.

Carlos Reales Dominguez is being retried on two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted murder after the first jury acquitted him of first-degree murder but did not reach unanimous verdicts on the remaining charges. He has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. His defense does not dispute that he carried out the attacks; it argues that his mental illness prevented the state from proving murder and attempted-murder intent, and defense counsel has told jurors that involuntary manslaughter is the appropriate verdict on the deaths. Prosecutors argue that Dominguez acted with the required intent despite psychosis they contend was caused or worsened by heavy cannabis use. Jurors began deliberating this week. [1][2][3]

That is the guilt-phase question. A separate issue arose during closing arguments: Judge Samuel T. McAdam found that the prosecution had violated California’s Racial Justice Act, or RJA, for a third time in this retrial. [1]

What the Racial Justice Act does

California Penal Code section 745 says the state may not seek or obtain a conviction—or seek, obtain or impose a sentence—on the basis of race, ethnicity or national origin. The law reaches more than openly racist statements. It also covers language that, viewed objectively and in context, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including racially coded references to a defendant’s culture, ethnicity or national origin. A defendant must prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning more likely than not. Intentional discrimination is not required. [4]

That last point matters. An RJA ruling does not necessarily mean a judge has found that a prosecutor consciously intended to discriminate. It means the court found that protected identity was brought into the criminal process in a way the statute forbids.

Here, Deputy District Attorney Alex Kian argued during closing that Dominguez had made a series of poor choices, including joining a fraternity that testimony described as Filipino-based. The defense objected that the argument tied Dominguez’s Salvadoran background, his status as a first-generation college student, his experience learning English and his cultural association with the fraternity to a narrative of personal decline.

Judge McAdam agreed that the prosecution had crossed the line. According to courtroom reporting, the judge found that evidence of cannabis use had been admitted for the limited purpose of addressing Dominguez’s mental state—not to disparage fraternity members, turn a cultural organization into character evidence or suggest that Dominguez’s background formed part of a path toward violence. [1][2]

What the ruling did immediately

The finding did not end the trial, dismiss the charges or decide whether Dominguez was guilty.

The judge struck the challenged portions of the closing argument. He told jurors to give those remarks no weight and not to discuss them during deliberations. He also reminded them that cannabis evidence could be considered only for the limited purpose for which it had been admitted. [1]

That is a curative remedy: an instruction intended to remove an improper argument from the jury’s decision-making. California’s RJA gives trial judges a range of remedies before judgment, depending on the violation. Those can include granting a defense request for a mistrial, discharging the jury and seating a new one, reducing charges or imposing another lawful remedy tailored to the problem. The statute does not make every violation an automatic mistrial or dismissal. It requires a remedy specific to the violation found. [4]

Why three findings matter

McAdam described the closing-argument ruling as the third RJA violation in the retrial. The first two involved prosecution peremptory challenges to prospective jurors who were Black and Hispanic. The judge said those earlier violations had been remedied. [1]

Three findings do not create an automatic legal result by simple arithmetic. The law does not say “three violations equals dismissal,” nor does the number itself determine the verdict.

But the accumulation matters because a reviewing court would examine the complete trial record, not each incident in isolation. If Dominguez is convicted, the defense could argue that the combined effect of the jury-selection violations and the closing-argument violation was not fully cured. The prosecution could respond that the trial judge identified each problem and imposed remedies sufficient to protect the proceedings.

That dispute would concern the integrity of the process. It would not erase what happened to Breaux, Abou Najm and Guillory, and it would not itself answer what mental state Dominguez had during the attacks.

After judgment, the RJA provides stronger remedies when a court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of the statute. The court must vacate the conviction and sentence and order new proceedings. If only the sentence was affected, the sentence must be vacated and replaced. Whether this case ever reaches that point would depend on the verdict, later motions or appeals, and findings not yet made. [4]

What happens if the jury returns a guilty verdict

Because Dominguez entered both a standard not-guilty plea and a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea, California uses a two-stage process.

The current jury first decides guilt: whether prosecutors proved the charged offenses or any available lesser offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. For that phase, California law presumes the defendant was legally sane. If the jury acquits him, there is no sanity phase. If it returns a guilty verdict, the case moves promptly to a second trial on sanity, usually before the same jury unless the judge orders otherwise. [5]

In that second phase, jurors decide whether Dominguez was legally sane or insane when the offenses occurred. That is a narrower legal question than whether he had schizophrenia, experienced psychosis or used cannabis. Mental illness alone does not automatically establish legal insanity. The jury would hear the evidence under the rules governing the insanity defense and return a separate sanity verdict.

The RJA ruling does not decide either phase. It does not establish guilt, innocence or insanity. It means only that race, ethnicity, national origin and cultural identity may not be used—directly or by implication—as evidence of bad character or criminal responsibility.

For Breaux’s and Abou Najm’s families, for Guillory, for Dominguez and for the public, the law requires both questions to be kept intact: what the evidence proves about the charged acts and mental state, and whether the state pursued its case through a process free from prohibited racial bias.

No verdict should be predicted from the RJA finding. The jury must decide the case from the admissible evidence and the court’s instructions.

At Neural Edge Publishing, Cassian Creed writes these explainers to keep the law legible and the record straight — centered on the victims, careful with the people involved, and clear about what a ruling does and does not decide.

Sources

1. Davis Vanguard, “Yolo Judge Cites Third Racial Justice Act Violation in Dominguez Retrial,” July 16, 2026: davisvanguard.org
2. Courthouse News Service, “Attorneys in California murder case argue intent, cannabis-induced psychosis as trial nears end,” July 15, 2026: courthousenews.com
3. ABC10, “Jury deliberates in retrial of former UC Davis student accused of Davis attacks,” July 16, 2026: abc10.com
4. California Penal Code § 745, current text effective January 1, 2026: leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
5. California Penal Code § 1026, current text: leginfo.legislature.ca.gov